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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND KENTUCKY'S
NEW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROVISIONS -
WAITING FOR THE OTHER SHOE TO DROP
On June 28, 1972, the predominant form of punishment
inflicted throughout the world upon those convicted of very
serious crimes was death by execution. A 1962 study' of 128
nations revealed that 110 of them retained some form of capital
punishment. Although in some nations there had been de facto
abolition of the death penalty, (Lichtenstein, for example,
while still governed by a death penalty statute, has not experi-
enced an execution since 1792), there had been no discernible
world-wide trend toward formal abolition. Rather, during the
quarter of a century between 1943 and 1968, as many countries
reinstituted capital punishment as abolished it.2 Thus, the in-
fliction of death by either hanging, shooting, decapitation,
electrocution, strangulation, or stoning was deemed an accept-
able form of punishment throughout most of the world.'
In this country, forty-one states and the District of Colum-
bia were governed by statutes which provided for the infliction
of death as the punishment for at least one crime.4 However,
on the final day of its October 1971 Term, the United States
Supreme Court announced its 5-to-4 decision in Furman v.
Georgia5 and, for the first time, held unconstitutional a death
penalty statute. In a terse per curiam opinion, followed by five
concurring and four dissenting opinions, the Court wrote sim-
ply that: ". . . the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."'
I Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective in CRIcAL
ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF CRIME 267 (1968).
2 Id.
3 Id.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
'Id. at 239-40.
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The Georgia 7 and Texas' statutes challenged in Furman
and its companion cases,9 permitted a jury, upon finding the
defendant guilty of a capital offense, to impose in its discretion
either death or a lesser penalty. The failure of those statutes
to provide guidelines or standards to direct the jury's decision,
and the resultant potential for arbitrary sentencing, appeared
to constitute the crux of the rationale of the majority. However,
two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, opined that the infliction
of the death penalty, in any form, constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment.'"
The Commonwealth of Kentucky was one of the jurisdic-
tions whose statutory scheme for the administration of the
death penalty was interrupted by the Furman decision." The
Kentucky murder statute, as well as nearly a dozen other Ken-
tucky penal provisions then in effect,' 2 permitted the imposi-
tion of the death penalty at the discretion of the jury. The
murder statute provided: "Any person who commits wilful
murder shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary
for life, or by death."' 3 Thus, the Kentucky statutes delineated
precisely the same mechanism for the selection of the punish-
ment in capital cases-the jury operating without guidelines or
directions formulated by the state-which the Court had de-
clared unconstitutional in Furman.
Incensed by judicial repeal of a favored and traditional
form of punishment reserved for those whose crimes were
deemed heinous, and inflamed by a number of post-Furman
atrocities,' 4 public interest focused on the January 1974
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971).
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1961).
9 Jackson v. Georgia, No. 69-5030; Branch v. Texas, No.. 69-5031.
10 See text accompanying notes 25-28 infra.
" Caine v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 824, 832 (Ky. 1973).
'2 Ky. REV. STAT. § 433.140 [hereinafter cited as KRS] (armed robbery); KRS §
433.150 (assault to rob or with intent to rob); KRS § 433.390 (causing death by train
wrecking); KRS § 435.030 (killing during advocacy of criminal syndicalism); KRS §
435.040 (causing death of a woman by abortion); KRS § 435.060 (causing death by
obstructing a road); KRS § 435.070 (lynching); KRS § 435.080 (rape of a child under
12); KRS § 435.090 (rape of a female over 12); KRS § 435.140 (kidnapping for ransom);
KRS § 435.190 (reckless shooting into train or motor vehicle).
,1 KRS § 435.010. By virtue of Ky. R. CouM. P. 9.84, the jury is required to fix the
penalty in all cases involving offenses punishable by death.
" These included the brutal slaying of a Lexington minister, his son and daughter,
and two others by two escaped convicts in October 1973.
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biennial session of the Kentucky General Assembly. The law-
makers, obviously sharing the sentiments of their constituents,
voted by an overwhelming margin to enact, as part of the new
Penal Code, a provision requiring the imposition of the death
sentence upon those convicted of crimes denominated in the
statute as "capital offenses." 5
At this juncture, long after the initial debate generated by
Furman has faded into history, it seems appropriate not only
to study the new law representing the reaction by Kentucky's
legislature to the requirements of the Furman decision,18 but
also to examine larger issues aroused by the apparent direction
of current eighth amendment litigation, such as: 1) the possible
development by the Supreme Court of new rules by which to
judge the cruelty and unusualness of punishments 7 and 2) the
extent to which the death penalty merits retention as an
effective and worthwhile implement in the criminal justice sys-
tem."8
I. THE FURMAN DECISION
What did the Supreme Court hold in Furman v. Georgia?"
Through the use of ten separate opinions-one per curiam, five
majority concurring, and four dissenting-and two hundred
thirty-two pages in the United States Reports, the nine Jus-
tices approached the capital punishment issue from practically
every angle. One commentator 2' has identified a total of six
separate tests employed by the five majority Justices to deter-
mine whether a particular punishment is "cruel and unusual"
under the eighth amendment. Another "' accurately stated that
no two Justices agreed exactly on their reasons for invalidating
the Georgia and Texas laws. Thus, one who would attempt to
draw broad generalizations from the Court's diverse exposi-
tions assumes a precarious position.
,1 Ky. AcTs ch. 406, § 61 (1974).
1" KRS § 507.020(2) (Special Supp. 1974).
, See text accompanying notes 106-153 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 154-55 infra.
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment, II: The Death Penalty After
Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. Rv. 62 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler].
21 Reed, Furman v. Georgia and Kentucky Statutory Law, 37 Ky. B.J. 25 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Reed].
1975]
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Nevertheless, a review of state court decisions construing
Furman2 and a study of the numerous scholarly analyses2
which have appeared in the two years since that decision lead
to this evaluation of the common ground reached by the
Furman majority: The gravamen of the Georgia and Florida
statutes' violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments was the arbitrary manner in
which sentences could be selected and applied. Specifically,
the statutory procedures were termed arbitrary because they
permitted the imposition of either death or lesser penalties
solely in the discretion of a jury operating without standards
or guidelines to aid in the sentencing decision.
In order to demonstrate that punishments selected arbi-
trarily may be applied in a cruel and unusual manner, four of
the Justices cited certain undesirable results brought about by
the statutes in question. Justice Douglas found arbitrariness in
the allegedly discriminatory application of capital punishment
to minority group members, principally Negroes, who have in
the past been executed in a proportion far greater than their
numbers bear to the population as a whole.M Quoting former
Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the effect that "[i]t is the
poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless and the hated who
are executed,' 25 Justice Douglas wrote that "[o]ne searches
our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the
affluent strata of this society. The Leopolds and Loebs are
given prison terms, not sentenced to death."28
2 See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973); People v. Fitzpatrick, 300
N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1973); State v. Jarrette, 202 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. 1974).
An interesting pre-Furman case is People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr.
152 (1972), in which the Supreme Court of California held that a state constitutional
provision prohibiting "cruel or unusual" punishments was violated by the death pen-
alty, which, according to the court, is cruel though not necessarily unusual.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 76-85 (1973);
Ehrhardt, The Aftermath of Furman: The Florida Experience, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
2 (1973); Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
82 YALE L. REV. 1111 (1973); Reed, supra note 21; Wheeler, supra note 20; Comment,
Capital Punishment After Furman, 64 J. CalM. L. & CRim. 281 (1973).
21 408 U.S. at 253, 256. For relevant statistics see 408 U.S. at 250 n.15. In Ken-
tucky, since the electric chair was installed at Eddyville in 1911, 79 whites and 83
blacks (from a much smaller population) have been executed. Of the 99 persons exe-
cuted since 1930, only seven were high school graduates, and none attended college.
Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 5, 1974.
2n 408 U.S. at 251.
26 Id. at 251-52.
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Justices Brennan, White, and Stewart, on the other hand,
deemed the questioned procedures arbitrary on the ground that
the death penalty had been applied so infrequently that no
rational basis could be found to distinguish the circumstances
of those few cases in which it was applied from the many,
apparently similar situations in which it was not.2 1 Justice
Marshall, the fifth member of the majority, did not cite arbi-
trariness as a reason for his invalidation of the statutes. While
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White stopped short of the
question of the constitutionality of capital punishment per se,
Justices Brennan and Marshall asserted that the imposition of
the death penalty, under any circumstances, constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.3
The majority opinions in Furman thus indicate that in
determining whether the new death penalty provisions enacted
by Kentucky and various other states in response to Furman
are valid under the eighth amendment, a question of vital im-
portance may be whether the provisions are free from the de-
fects of infrequent imposition and potentially discriminatory
application which rendered arbitrary, and thus cruel and unu-
sual, the Georgia and Texas statutes.
11. EmCT OF FURMAN ON THE ROLE OF THE JURY
The responsibility for making the momentous decision of
whether or not to put a man to death has in America tradition-
ally been vested in a group of his peers, rather than in an
agency of the state.29 Prior to the Furman ruling, all states
which provided for the imposition of the death penalty required
jury participation in the sentencing decision,3 although only
thirteen states provided for jury sentencing in non-capital
cases.3 ' In nearly all states, the jury was empowered, upon con-
viction of the defendant in a capital case, to fix his punishment
- Id. at 293, 310, 313.
13 Id. at 286.
2, See notes 32-35 infra.
SAMERCAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCE ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 47 (Tent. Draft
1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
3 Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 969 (1967). See the
statutes listed at 969 n.2.
1975]
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at either death or some lesser punishment." Among the reasons
which have been advanced for these alternatives are: 1) the
prevention of jury nullification;" 2) the belief in the need for
such a drastic measure as a death sentence to reflect, insofar
as possible, a community consensus; 4 and 3) the understand-
able reluctance of trial judges to singularly bear the burden of
pronouncing so onerous a judgment. 5
Statutes in various states conferring upon the jury the
power to determine punishment typically remain silent as to
the manner or extent to which the jury could be aided in its
sentencing decision by the introduction at the trial of evidence
relevant solely to the issue of punishment." From this dearth
of statutory standards there evolved in the United States two
contrary lines of state appellate court decisions-one of which
held that evidence relevant solely to the issue of punishment
could, 37 and the other of which held that such evidence could
not, 8 be introduced at trial. In those jurisdictions allowing the
introduction of evidence relevant only to the issue of punish-
ment however, a wide variety of evidence has been admitted.
Thus, for example, facts concerning the defendant's environ-
ment, his motive for the crime, the presence of any mental
defect in the defendant, any provocation he may have encoun-
tered, his age, and the intoxication of the defendant at the time
of the commission of the offense have all been admitted for
consideration by the jury. 9 Yet, even upon the introduction of
such evidence, the jury has usually retained the power to fix
sentences in capital cases without reference to any set of
standards or formal guidelines.
u Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. Rv. 1099
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Knowlton].
= State v. Molnar, 44 A.2d 197, 202 (N.J. 1945).
See ABA STANDARDS at 47.
5 Id.
31 Knowlton, supra note 32, at 1108.
31 Id. at 1109 n.66.
Id. at 1108 n.52.
3, Id. at 1116-17. For example, in the Kentucky case of Harris v. Commonwealth,
209 S.W. 509 (Ky. 1919), the Court held that evidence of the accused's drunkenness
at the time of the homicide, while not admissible to show lack of malice and thus
support an instruction on manslaughter, is admissible to demonstrate that a human
frailty influenced the crime and to assist the jury to fix the defendant's punishment
at either death or life imprisonment.
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Furthermore, appellate courts have manifested an unwill-
ingness to remove the jury's power to finally determine death
sentences. In Kentucky, for example, the Court of Appeals has
steadfastly refused to overturn its rule that a sentence fixed by
the jury, if within the limits prescribed by statute, is valid and
may not be reviewed on appeal. 0 The Court has been unwilling
to weigh the evidence in each case to determine the reasonable-
ness of the sentence, and has held that the fact that the jury
fixes punishment at death rather than at life imprisonment
does not authorize an inference of passion or prejudice on the
jury's part." The tradition of delegating to the jury final sen-
tencing authority is maintained even under Kentucky's new
Penal Code.42 Although the trial judge may modify an "unduly
harsh" jury determination of sentence in a felony case, he is
powerless to modify the sentence of death imposed by statute
upon the jury's convicting the defendant of a capital offense.43
By casting doubt upon the fairness and wisdom of jury
sentence determinations, the majority opinions in Furman dif-
fer fundamentally with the long standing principle which rec-
ognizes as valid the reservation of discretion in the jury to
impose the death penalty in a given case not under the guid-
ance of a formal set of standards, but rather in accordance with
the effect of the evidence upon the sensibilities of the jurors.
This principle is reflected in the following statement by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in an opinion rendered less than a
year before the decision in Furman:
Jurors have an option upon conviction in murder cases of
imposing sentences of life imprisonment or death. We feel
certain that most jurors would be reluctant to impose the
death penalty and would do so only in aggravated cases and
when their duty requires them to do so."
Little imagination is required to perceive that the reac-
tions of twelve "good men and true" to the facts adduced in a
given case, and the degree of heinousness each is willing to
" Spurlock v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1949).
" Lane v. Commonwealth, 75 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1934); Bryant v. Commonwealth,
259 S.W.2d 1038 (Ky. 1924).
y K. AcTS ch. 406 (1974).
KRS § 532.070, .030.
" Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ky. 1971).
1975]
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attribute to the crime, are likely to vary as widely as the back-
grounds, experiences, biases, and predilections of the individ-
ual jury members. It might be an exaggeration to say that one
man's cruelty is another man's kindness; yet it does not appear
unreasonable to assume that facts which in the view of some
jurors would sufficiently aggravate the offense to necessitate
imposition of the death penalty would produce quite a different
response in others.
Clearly, then, the fate of a defendant convicted under the
pre-Furman Kentucky Revised Statutes § 435.010 [hereinafter
cited as KRS] and similar statutes was inextricably inter-
twined with the personae of the jury and their individual sensi-
bilities and attitudes. Apparently, this condition was the gra-
vamen of the evil which, under a variety of pretexts and ex-
planations, the majority of the Furman Court sought to eradi-
cate. Statutory schemes by which juries fix punishments in
their unfettered discretion permit, according to the members
of the Court, the exercise of whim or caprice by the jury. In the
view of a majority of the Furman Justices, the premise that,
under such a scheme, the death penalty may be imposed arbi-
trarily is demonstrated by the infrequency with which it has
been inflicted, and by the discriminatory manner with which,
in the belief of some, it has been meted out to the black and
the poor. As noted above, the administration of capital punish-
ment in such an arbitrary manner amounts, according to
Furman, to the infliction of c'ruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment.45
An analysis of the Furman rationale leads to this question:
Is the phenomenon of discretionary sentence determination
(i.e., that the selection depends to some extent upon the pre-
dilections and sensibilities of the sentence determiner) likely to
change under any scheme? It is submitted that only if some
means were devised to delegate the task of sentencing to some
emotionless entity, such as a computer, could the human char-
acteristics of discrimination, compassion and avarice be com-
pletely eliminated. At any rate, the .Furman decision appears
to have cleared the way for a new avenue of inquiry into the
role of the jury in our criminal justice system. And, as the
Is See text accompanying notes 22-28, supra.
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following discussion demonstrates, this inquiry already has
produced some tangible results within the penal statutes of
Kentucky.
III. THE NEW KENTUCKY DEATH PENALTY PROVISIONS
The shock waves which covered the nation in the nonths
after the Furman decision resulted in the passage, in 28 states,
of new laws designed to retain the death penalty in a constitu-
tional form by restricting the amount of discretion to impose
sentences vested in the jury. One writer" has classified each of
these statutes into one of four models:
1) The "aggravating (circumstances) only" model,
wherein a sentence of death must be imposed by the jury if one
or more circumstances attending the criminal act, denomi-
nated by statute as "aggravating circumstances," are proved.47
Statutes of this form have been enacted in Georgia,48 Illinois,4
Montana, 0 and Utah.5'
2) The "aggravating-mitigating (circumstances)" model,
in which, following the basic structure of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, 2 statutes provide a list of both
mitigating and aggravating circumstances which may attend
the crime, and permit the imposition of a capital sentence only
upon 1) a finding of one or more aggravating circumstances,
and 2) a determination that any mitigating circumstances also
proved do not "outweigh" the aggravating circumstances pres-
ent. 3 Arizona, 54 Arkansas, 5 Florida,56 Nebraska, 7 and Tennes-
see58 have enacted such laws.
3) The "quasi-mandatory" model, adopted by five
Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes,
87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1699 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Discretion].
'7 Id. at 1700.
,0 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528, -2534.1, -2537 (Supp. 1973).
" ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch., 38 §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, -8-A (1973).
50 MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §§ 94-5-105 (Spec. Crim. Code Supp. 1973).
" UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-207, -5-202 (Supp. 1973).
52 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
Discretion, supra note 46, at 1704.
ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.454 (D) to (F) (Supp. 1973).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4710 to 4712 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
'7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523 (Supp. 1973).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2406 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63
states, in which an attempt is made to eliminate the factfin-
der's exercise of discretion by providing lists of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances but permitting the imposition of a
death sentence only when it is found that one or more aggravat-
ing factors or circumstances, but no mitigating circumstances,
attended the crime. 9 California," Connecticut," Ohio,6" Penn-
sylvania,s and Texas64 have enacted these so-called "quasi-
mandatory" statutes.
4) The "mandatory" model, adopted by either statute or
court decision in fourteen states, removes all discretion from
the post-conviction sentencing decision by providing death as
the mandatory penalty for certain offenses committed under
circumstances defined by statute. 5 "Mandatory" states are
Delaware, 6 Idaho, 7 Indiana,6" Kentucky, 9 Louisiana,7 Missis-
sippi,7' Nevada, 72 New Hampshire, 73 New Mexico,I New York,75
North Carolina,76 Oklahoma, 77 Rhode Island,7 and Wyoming.
79
As noted, the new Kentucky Penal Code provisions, KRS
§ 507.020(2)80 and KRS § 509.040(2)," ' which became effective
January 1, 1975, fall into the "mandatory" category and pro-
vide as follows:
§ 507.020(2). Murder is a class A felony, except that in the
following situations it is a capital offense:
5' Discretion, supra note 46, at 1709.
6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 to .3 (West Supp. 1974).
" P.A. 73-137, 4(e) [1973] Conn. Leg. Serv. 184 (West).
62 OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01, 2929.02 to .04 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).
* Pa. Act No. 46, 158th General Assembly (March 26, 1974).
"TFx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1973).
Id. at 1710.
66 Del. ch. 284, 127th General Assembly (March 29, 1974).
IDAHO CODE § 18-4003, -4004 (Supp. 1974).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3401 (Supp. 1973).
6 KRS §§ 507.020(2); 509.040(2); 532.030(1).
70 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1974).
1, Miss. ch. 576, 1974 General Assembly (1974).
12 NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.030 1. (1973).
" N.H. ch. 34, 1974 General Court, Spec. Sess. (Apr. 3, 1974).
' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (Supp. 1973)..
N.Y. ch. 367, 1974 Legislative Assembly (May 6, 1974).
76 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-176.4 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
'n OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.3 (Supp. 1973).
?I R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1973).
, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (Supp. 1973).
Ky. Acrs ch. 406, § 61 (1974).
, Id. at 76.
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(a) The defendant's act of killing was intentional and
was for profit or hire;
(b) The defendant's act of killing was intentional, and
occurred during the commision of arson in the first de-
gree, robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first
degree, or rape in the first degree;
(c) The defendant's act of killing was intentional and
the defendant was a prisoner and the victim was a
prison employee engaged at the time of the act in the
performance of his duties;
(d) The defendant's act of killing was intentional and
the death was caused through the use of a destructive
device, as defined in KRS 237.030(1);
(e) The defendant's act or acts of killing were inten-
tional and resulted in multiple death;
(f) The defendant's act of killing was intentional and
the victim was a police officer, sheriff or deputy sheriff
engaged at the time of the act in the lawful performance
of his duties.
§ 509.040(2). Kidnapping is a capital offense unless defen-
dant voluntarily releases the victim alive, substantially un-
harmed, and in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is
a class B felony.
KRS § 507.020(2) fixes a mandatory penalty of death upon
each defendant convicted of intentional murder under one of
the six sets of circumstances enumerated in the statute. On its
face, the provision removes from the jury the ability either to
apply the death penalty discriminatorily or to impose it infre-
quently, because once a guilty verdict is returned, no possibil-
ity exists for jury discretion in the determination of sentence.
The same reasoning applies to the kidnapping provision, KRS
§ 509.040(2).
Nevertheless, some authorities have concluded that even
a so-called "mandatory" procedure does not preclude the exer-
cise of some discretion by the jury and other actors at various
stages in the criminal justice process.2 The jury retains discre-
tion in the sense that even though a conviction of a capital
offense must result in a death sentence, the jury may, after its
deliberation in a given case, convict the defendant of either the
"See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 23, at 85; Comment, 64 J. CUM.
L. & CalM. 281, supra note 23 at 284.
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capital offense or some lesser included offense. Consider for
example, a prosecution for murder. According to the official
commentary to the Penal Code,83 a condition of extreme
emotional disturbance in the accused at the time of the killing
serves to reduce the crime of murder to that of manslaughter
in the first degree, a class B felony punishable by ten-to-twenty
years imprisonment. Therefore, upon the introduction by the
defendant in a capital case of evidence that the homicide was
committed while he was under the influence of some extreme
emotional disturbance, the trial judge would be required to
give a manslaughter instruction. Thus, in every case in which
he is able to introduce mitigating evidence, the jury will retain
the power to either put the defendant to death by convicting
him of the capital offense, or, if it so chooses, to spare his life
by convicting him of a lesser offense.
Clearly, pre-conviction jury discretion remains a fixture
in the death penalty process. However, since it was post-
conviction discretion which rendered the statutes invalid in
Furman, the Court has yet to rule on the question of the extent,
if any, to which the eighth amendment permits pre-conviction
discretion in capital cases. The Court's ultimate resolution of
this issue might depend upon whether there is a significant
difference in the two kinds of discretion when tested under the
standards employed by four of the majority Justices in
Furman: 1) the frequency, in view of all possible applications,
with which capital punishment is imposed and 2) the possibil-
ity of discriminatory application of the death penalty based
upon race or other invalid criteria. However, at least one mem-
ber of the Furman Court indicated his belief that real changes
in jury discretion cannot be brought about so long as juries
retain the power to render a verdict on a lesser charge. 4
IV. OTHER DISCRETIONARY ROLES
In addition to the jury's deliberations, discretion can be
exercised by other participants at various points in the judicial
process. The Commonwealth's Attorney, under KRS §
13 LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, THE KENTUCKY PENAL CODE 99 (Nov. 1971
Draft).
1 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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532.030(1),85 may, with regard to a given killing, seek an indict-
ment of the defendant either for intentional murder as a capital
offense, or for intentional murder as a class A felony punishable
by a prison term of from 20 years to life. And, under Section
77 of the State Constitution, the Governor of Kentucky is em-
powered to commute sentences in all criminal cases. Clearly,
these officials must exercise discretion in the performance of
their duties, and in neither instance does the applicable statute
or constitutional provision establish guidelines or standards for
the officials to follow. Thus, even if.the jury's role in capital
cases under the new Kentucky Penal Code can pass muster
under the eighth amendment, questions remain as to the con-
stitutionality of the exercise of discretion by these other actors
in the judicial process.
A. The Prosecutor
At some point, the prosecutor must evaluate the available
evidence and, in his discretion, decide whether to proceed
against the accused and, if so, for which degree of the offense
to seek an indictment. It is not difficult to visualize the miscar-
riages of justice which would result if the Kentucky Common-
wealth's Attorney were stripped of this discretionary power and
were required to prosecute, with equal vigor and in the same
fashion, each individual, whether perceived as guilty or inno-
cent by the prosecutor.
As was stated in a recent state court decision:8"
The purpose of vesting the power of judgment in an official
is to enable him to make different decisions in different cases
in the light of what he determines to be materially different
factual situations. All governmental actions are based on this
delegation of responsibility. The Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States does not require a state,
in the enforcement of its criminal laws, so to hedge its prose-
cuting attorney about with "guidelines" that he becomes a
mere automaton, acting on the impulse of a computer and
treating all persons accused of criminal conduct exactly alike.
From the foundation of the country to the present date, thd
Ky. AcTs ch. 406, § 275 (1974).
" State v. Jarrette, 202 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. 1974).
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discretion, now complained of. . . has been vested in prose-
cuting officers throughout the country. Without it, the great-
est injustices would necessarily be inflicted upon innocent
persons accused of crime."7
B. The Governor
In the Anglo-American experience, the chief executive of
a jurisdiction traditionally has been vested with the power to
commute sentences and grant reprieves and pardons to those
convicted of crimes. The clemency power is intended "to afford
relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation
or enforcement of the criminal law."88
It can be argued that a governor's discretionary power, like
that of the prosecutor, could be exercised in an arbitrary man-
ner to grant reprieves in some cases and deny them in others
without apparent reason or for invalid reasons. Although one
study 9 identified a total of 13 standards applied by American
governors in arriving at their clemency decisions, few could
doubt that some chief executives have eschewed the use of
objective criteria and have relied upon personal views and pre-
dilections to monitor their actions.
One commentator9 has written that the clemency deci-
sions of American governors are examinable to insure that all
defendants are treated non-arbitrarily and equally and are pro-
vided substantive due process and equal protection of law. Yet,
the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that
"[executive clemency] is a check entrusted to the executive
for special cases. . . . [Wihoever is to make it useful must
have full discretion to exercise it."9
Is the clemency decision of Kentucky's governor review-
able under the fourteenth amendment by the federal courts?
As eighth amendment rights evolve, will the discretion vested
" Id. at 742.
" Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925).
0 H. BURNs, EXECUnrZV COMMUTATION IN CAPrrAL CASES 20 (1969).
See Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 21 CATHoLc L.
Rxv. 94 (1971); Ringold, The Dynamics of Executive Clemency, 52 A.B.A.J. 240, 242
(1966); Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 136 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Executive Clemency].
9 Executive Clemency, supra note 90, at 181.
92 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (Taft, C.J.) (emphasis added).
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by Kentucky's constitution and statutes in the governor and
commonwealth's attorneys render this state's death penalty
law violative of the prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punish-
ments? Answers to these questions, like the resolution of the
issue whether the new law vests excessive "pre-conviction"
discretion in juries, must await Supreme Court action in the
post-Furman era.
3
V. ALTERNATIVES TO KENTUCKY'S NEW DEATH PENAtTY LAW
If the new Kentucky plan for the imposition of the death
penalty is held unconstitutional, then it appears that the Gen-
eral Assembly will be faced with the dilemma of: (1) adopting
a statute furnishing the jury with some type of circumstance-
oriented guidelines to apply in the exercise of its power to de-
termine sentences;94 (2) enacting a true mandatory death pen-
alty, thereby narrowing the jury's alternatives in a given case
to either convicting the defendant of the capital offense or ac-
quitting him; or (3) abolishing the death penalty in Kentucky.
A. The Aggravation/Mitigation Jury Determination
The continued constitutional validity of laws of this type
is uncertain. Although such statutes enumerate guidelines in
the form of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
jury, in fixing sentence, is still imbued with a broad life-or-
death discretion. To illustrate, assume that a statute of the
type explained previously prescribes a list of both aggravating
and mitigating factors. 5 If in determining the penalty the jury
should ascertain the presence at the time of the crime of one
or more aggravating factors, the penalty of death must be af-
fixed unless the jury also finds the existence of one or more
mitigating factors. In the latter instance, a sentence of life
imprisonment must be rendered. Under this type of statute,
" The answers to these and other questions should be forthcoming soon. The
Supreme Court is presently faced with a capital punishment case in which the Court
must provide some guidance in the area of the eighth amendment. State v. Fowler,
203 S.E.2d 803 (N.C.), cert. granted sub nom. Fowler v. North Carolina, 95 S.Ct. 223
(1974) (No. 73-7031); State v. Sparks, 207 S.E.2d 712 (N.C. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1974) (No. 74-669).
" See text accompanying notes 46-79 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 45-63 supra.
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the ultimate choice (i.e., the selection of either life or death as
the penalty) depends not, as in Furman, upon the whim of a
jury allowed to exercise its unfettered discretion without stan-
dards or guidelines, but instead upon adherence to a rigid for-
mula prescribed by statute. However, the intermediate choices
required in order to operate the ultimate-choice formula (i.e.,
whether or not each of the aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances exists) must be made by a factfinder operating without
statutorily prescribed guidelines for those particular determi-
nations. Thus, such laws commit to the unfettered discretion
of the jury the ability to choose the alternatives which, under
the operation of the formula, will lead automatically to a choice
of sentence of either death or life imprisonment. The effect of
the intermediate factor method of sentence selection, of course,
has yet to be explored by the Court. But, from all appearances,
a plan providing for the mandatory application by the jury of
a statutory list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
only a step removed from the unfettered jury discretion con-
demned in Furman.
B. The "All-or-Nothing" Statute
The second alternative, the adoption of an "all-or-
nothing" mandatory statute, would probably prove both un-
wise and unconstitutional. Aside from the obvious undesirabil-
ity of confronting a jury with the choice of either executing the
defendant or freeing him, it is likely that such a law would be
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court. Chief Justice
Burger" and Justice Blackmun," dissenters in the Furman de-
cision, clearly expressed their preference to abolish the death
penalty rather than subject the jury to such a dilemma. Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice: "[U]nder such a system, the
death sentence could only be avoided by a verdict of acquittal.
If this is the only alternative that the legislature can safely
pursue under today's ruling, I would have preferred that the
Court opt for total abolition."" Thus, it appears certain that
such a scheme, even if enacted, would be avoided by an alli-
408 U.S. at 401.
" Id. at 413.
" Id. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ance of at least these five Justices: Burger, Blackmun, Bren-
nan, Douglas, and Marshall.
It has been suggested by some observers (though disputed
by others) that the new Kentucky provision, in the absence of
a "lesser included offense" instruction, will in effect require
that the jury be confronted with an "all-or-nothing" dilemma.
This result follows since KRS § 532.030(1), 9" by requiring the
Commonwealth's Attorney to elect at the time of indictment
to prosecute the crime as either a capital offense or a class A
felony, arguably precludes the Commonwealth from seeking a
lesser included offense instruction at the time of trial.
This possibility raises an intriguing question. If, for in-
stance, pursuant to KRS § 532.030, the Commonwealth elects
at the time of the indictment to prosecute the homicide as a
capital offense, and if such election precludes the Common-
wealth from seeking a lesser included offense instruction, must
the judge, in the absence of any evidence adduced by the defen-
dant to justify a lesser included offense instruction, instruct the
jury to acquit the defendant if there is reasonable doubt as to
the existence of any of the elements required by KRS §
507.020(2)? Suppose, for example, that the defendant was in-
dicted for murder as a capital offense, with the indictment
charging that the defendant's act of killing "was intentional
and was for profit or hire," as proscribed in KRS §
507.020(2)(a). Suppose further that although the proof was ir-
refutable, and certainly sufficient to satisfy the reasonable
doubt standard, that the defendant intentionally murdered his
victim, the prosecution was for some reason unable to demon-
strate at trial that the killing "was done for profit or hire."
Would the "killer" then go free? Apparently so, if one accepts
the interpretation that the election required by KRS § 532.030,
which must be made contemporaneous with the indictment,
precludes the Commonwealth from seeking a lesser included
offense instruction at the time of the trial.
It has been suggested00 that a practical solution to this
" This provision states:
When a person is convicted of a capital offense he shall have his punishment
fixed at death. However, any crime classified as a capital offense may at the
discretion of the state be prosecuted as a Class A felony, provided such
election to so prosecute is made at the time of the indictment.
IN Interview with State Senator Michael R. Moloney, in Lexington, Aug. 9, 1974.
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dilemma will be that the Commonwealth's Attorney, if he
doubts his ability in a given case to prove at trial every element
of the capital offense, will simply exercise his prerogative under
the statute to try the offense as a class A felony, punishable by
twenty years-to-life imprisonment. Still, it seems unlikely that
prosecutor's pre-trial evaluatons of their cases will always
prove accurate enough to forestall jury applications of Ken-
tucky's death penalty statutes in an all-or-nothing fashion. Nor
is it reasonable to assume that such a haphazard practical
safeguard could long prevent the invalidation of otherwise un-
constitutional statutory provisions.
C. Abolition
In the event that KRS § 507.020(2) is held unconstitu-
tional, and in the absence of a declaration that the death pen-
alty is invalid per se, there most likely will be a determined
effort to re-enact a death penalty statute in Kentucky. Debates
in the respective chambers of the Kentucky legislature over re-
enactment would surely include, in addition to arguments for
the adoption of a plan embodying guidelines in the form of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, renewed calls for
the complete abolition of capital punishment in this Common-
wealth.
A serious abolition movement would appear to require
both an inquiry into the effectiveness of capital punishment in
achieving the goals of the criminal justice system 0' and a re-
examination of the morality of the continued use of the death
penalty. The determination of the extent to which the morality
of the death penalty should be considered by the legislature
alongside its effectiveness, and the selection of standards to be
used in the determination of exactly what is and what is hot
moral, would seem to present vexing problems for any group of
legislators. Such questions as whether the social compact en-
visages a right of the people, collectively through their conven-
ient vehicle, the state, to extinguish the life of one of their
number may be incapable of satisfactory answer by statute.
It might be argued that the utilization of the death penalty
is merely an exercise in nature's first law, that of survival, since
"I See text accompanying notes 154-164 infra.
[Vol. 63
NEW CAPrrAL PuNisHmENT PROVISIONS
it is ostensibly through capital punishment that society is pro-
tected by the rational elimination of those whose continued
existence would pose an intolerable threat to their fellow men.
In this sense, capital punishment might be said to effect one
of the criminal justice system's commonly accepted goals-
isolation. °0 Yet, it cannot be denied that the death penalty,
at least when inflicted for murder, assumes many of the
attributes of revenge. It has been written that: "We do not
arrange for rapists to be sexually assaulted, nor burn down the
house of arsonists. Yet we think it natural . . . to insist on
killing the man who has killed."'0 3
The seeming futility of an attempt in a paper such as this,
or in even a volume, to capture the essence of the requisites of
a morality determination should not, of course, discourage in-
quiry upon the subject. Indeed, it may be argued that in the
coming years the issue of the morality of the death penalty may
arise not only upon the consideration by legislative bodies of
the sanction's desirability, but also upon the examination of its
constitutionality by the judiciary. For, as the Supreme Court
has written, the range of reference within which is determined
a punishment's cruelty and unusualness must include those
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."'0 '
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The discussion of whether the new Kentucky statute com-
ports with the guidelines which may be devined from the
Furman decision will, of course, be rendered moot if in Fowler
v. North Carolina"5 the Supreme Court declares the death pen-
alty unconstitutional per se. It has been suggested that the
Furman decision portends the eventual demise of the penalty
in all forms. Although only two Justices, Brennan and Mar-
shall, stated flatly their belief that the punishment of death is,
,,2 See note 149 infra.
11 L. BLOM-CooPER, THE HANGING QUESTION 6 (1969).
"I Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
,u State v. Fowler, 203 S.E.2d 803 (N.C.), cert. granted sub non. Fowler v. North
Carolina, 95 S.Ct. 223 (1974) (No. 73-7031); State v. Sparks, 207 S.E.2d 712 (N.C.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1974) (No. ,74-669).
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in and of itself, cruel and unusual, Justice Douglas implied as
much and several others expressed a possible personal prefer-
ence for abolition.
In forecasting the future route of the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the eighth amendment, it is necessary to exam-
ine the law as it has evolved to this time. The decision in
Furman represents the first direct ruling by the United States
Supreme Court on the question of whether the death penalty
amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
eighth amendment to the Constitution.' 6 The scope of the deci-
sion 107 was limited to proscription of the arbitrary manner of
sentence selection as provided by the Georgia and Texas laws
and did not include an examination by the Court as a whole of
the question of whether the death penalty is inherently cruel
and unusual. Although the Court heard arguments on that
issue on one previous occasion, it decided that case, Boykin v.
Alabama,'5 on other grounds. However, by its decisions dur-
ing the past century declaring constitutionally valid the use of
a number of particular means of execution, the Court has, of
course, tacitly sanctioned the use of death as a penalty.' 9
Fundamental to a discussion of the prospects for the reten-
tion of the death penalty in the United States is an examina-
tion of the standards or tests which the Supreme Court may
choose to employ in order to determine whether capital punish-
ment is per se cruel and unusual. The myriad of concepts dis-
cussed in the various opinions in Furman clouded rather than
cleared the air of doubts as to the tests to be applied under the
eighth amendment. One or more of the five majority Justices
employed six separate tests"0 to determine a punishment's va-
lidity. Public abhorrence,"' degradation of human dignity," 2
inherently excessive pain and suffering,"' excessiveness in rela-
106 The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 23, at 76.
"1 408 U.S. at 238.
109 395 U.S. 238, 249 n.3 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
,o See cases cited in The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 23, at 76 n.2.
110 Wheeler, supra note 20, 63.
II 408 U.S. at 332. "Public abhorrence" and the other five labels for the six tests
were attached by Wheeler, supra note 20, at 64-80.
112 408 U.S. at 271.
" Id. at 330.
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tion to purpose,"' unusualness,115 and arbitrariness, " , all were
enunciated by at least one Justice. Only as to the use of arbi-
trariness did four of the five majority Justices agree.
11 7
It is submitted that although the promise of "arbitrari-
ness" as an eighth amendment test would seem to be a panacea
in view of the fact of its near-universal acceptance by the
Furman majority, a limitation upon its future use, with regard
to the issue of the constitutionality per se of the death penalty,
lies in its narrow scope. Apparently, arbitrariness refers merely
to the manner in which a penalty is applied rather than to the
inherent nature of the penalty itself. Therefore, the determina-
tion of whether a punishment is constitutional per se would
appear to require a test which can be employed under the as-
sumption that the process whereby the penalty is selected or
administered is valid.
The potential for use of an arbitrariness test is further
diminished by the fact that although four of the majority Jus-
tices concluded that the death penalty was applied in an arbi-
trary manner in the cases under review, each cited a different
reason for his conclusions.' 8 In short, it appears that to dis-
cover the tests which the Court may develop to judge the con-
stitutionality per se of a given penalty, one must look back,
past the clouded opinions in the Furman decision, to other
major junctures in the history of the eighth amendment.
The debate in Congress in 1789 on the meaning of the
eighth amendment was miniscule and hardly indicative of that
body's legislative intent."9 Thus, the two most likely sources of
direction for a future Court's interpretation of the amend-
ment's language appear to be: 1) the intent of the nearly identi-
cal passage found in the eighth amendment's precursor, the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, and 2) the tests previously enun-
ciated by the Court in both capital and non-capital cases. 20
' Id. at 279.
' Id. at 331.
" Id. at 240, 260-69, 310, 312.
Wheeler, supra note 20, at 80.
Id.
' Mr. Justice Douglas noted that the entire debate in Congress on the eighth
amendment consisted of one transcribed page in the Annals of Congress. 408 U.S. at
244 (Douglas, J., concurring).
"I Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Rav. 839, 855 (1969).
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A. The English Bill of Rights of 1689
In the wake of the infamous Bloody Assizes, a series of
"pseudo trials that followed Monmouth's feeble attempt to
seize the throne"' 2' of England during the reigns of Charles II
and James II in the latter part of the 17th Century,' and at a
time when the penalty for treason in England consisted of the
following torturous chain of events:
1. That the offender be drawn to the gallows. . . .2. That he
be hanged by the neck, and then cut down alive. 3. That his
entrails be taken out and burned while he is yet alive. 4. That
his head be cut off. 5. That his body be divided into four
parts. 6. That his head and quarters be at the King's
disposal[;]21
there was enacted by Parliament on December 16, 1689, a dec-
laration "for the vindication of and asserting . . .ancient
rights and liberties"' 24 including "[t]hat excessive bail ought
not to be required; nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.' 25 This passage, written into
the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, and adopted nearly
verbatim as the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States,' 26 has been said to constitute, in view of the
events which led up to it, ". . . first, an objection to the impo-
sition of punishments which were unauthorized by statute, and
second, a reiteration of the English policy against dispropor-
tionate penalties.'
' 27
It has been urged that the eighth amendment must, be-
cause of its nearly identical language, be read in the light of the
foregoing passage of the English Bill of Rights.' 2 Furthermore,
it has been said that, when properly interpreted, the eighth
amendment proscribes more than merely those specific punish-
ments which may be identified as intended by it for prohibi-
121 408 U.S. at 254 (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting from I. BRANT, THi BiLL OF
RIGHTS 154 (1965).
" 408 U.S. at 254 (Douglas, J., concurring).
"2 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *92.
"I Granucci, supra note 120, at 855.
125 Id.
11 Id. at 853.
,27 Id. at 860.
' Id.; Wheeler, supra note 20, at 64 n.7.
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tion. Under this theory, the amendment forbids any punish-
ment which, though not specifically the target of its framers,
is found to run contrary to the spirit of either of the two princi-
ples of the English Bill of Rights-(1) punishments unauthor-
ized by statute or (2) punishments disproportionate to the of-
fense for which they are inflicted.'
If this interpretation of the function of the eighth amend-
ment is correct, it is clear that since the death penalty is in fact
authorized by the statute of 28 states, it is constitutionally
valid, unless its effect is to punish to an extent disproportionate
to the offense for which it is inflicted. This view finds support
in Weems v. United States,'30 where the Supreme Court wrote:
"It is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to the offense".' The Court's
opinion in Weems thus apparently adopted the view expressed
earlier in Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont'12 that
the eighth amendment prohibits "punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the
offense charged.'
'3 3
A further examination of the Court's interpretation of the
eighth amendment prior to Furman, in response to challenges
to both the manner of carrying out the death penalty'3 4 and to
the inherent qualities of certain non-capital punishments,
3
1
reveals that while the Court has never clearly, concisely, and
exhaustively set forth the standards required to determine a
given punishment's constitutionality, it has enunciated several
broad concepts which have guided its actions in particular
cases. By dicta, "unnecessary" pain 36 and cruelty'3 have been
proscribed, as has "inhumane and barbarous" treatment.3 8
Punishments which are not "graduated and proportioned to
the offense" were proscribed in Weems, '3 and those which vio-
I" Id.
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
' ' Id. at 367.
132 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 339-40.
' See notes 136-38 infra.
'3 See notes 139-43 infra.
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
I" Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
In In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
'' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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late the "dignity of man" according to the "evolving standards
of decency" of society were said to be cruel and unusual in Trop
v. Dulles.' Moreover, the Court in Robinson v. California'
voided a punishment because it was "universally thought"'1 2 in
"the light of contemporary human knowledge"'' to be cruel
and unusual.
One commentator has complained that although Weems
and Trop established ". . . the [Eighth] Amendment restricts
both the amount and nature of permissible punishment, . . .
neither case . . . clearly established the tests to be applied in
examining the amount or nature of the challenged punish-
ment."'
On the other hand, these and other cases do indicate that
the Court may negate punishments (1) to which public atti-
tudes are sufficiently adverse, and (2) which exact too great a
toll when compared with the harm of the offenses for which
they are inflicted.
B. Analysis of Various Eighth Amendment Tests
It is readily apparent from an examination of the Supreme
Court's eighth amendment cases that some enormously diffi-
cult questions are raised and left unanswered by the Court's
sparse and enigmatic interpretations. For example, it might be
asked: What, exactly, is meant by the Court's use of the term
"disproportionate"? How can it be determined whether a given
punishment is disproportionate to the offense for which it is
imposed? Also, when may it be proclaimed that our society's
"standards of decency" have evolved, or that public opinion
has, indeed, become "enlightened by a humane justice," to the
point of abhorrence of the death penalty?
1. The Standards of Decency Test
It is submitted that one of the reasons for the Court's
failure thus far to enunciate tests by which to determine
"'. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
1' 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
112 Id. at 666.
143 Id.
"I Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838, 841
(1972).
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whether the "dignity of man" or his sense of "humane justice"
suffer due to the infliction of the death penalty may be that
judges are no more able than anyone else to feel the pulse of a
nation of 212 million people, much less to monitor so compli-
cated a psychological and emotional response as "dignity."
While it might be true, as Mr. Jefferson wrote, that "[w]e
might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted
him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the
regimen of their barbarous ancestors,"145 it is doubtless also
correct that affronts to the "standards of decency" of our so-
ciety or to the "dignity of man" are probably more susceptible
to identification and application in the treatises of clerics or
philosophers, or better still by every individual at his own lei-
sure, than by a poll of nine judges in a conference room. At any
rate, even if public opinion is a valid constitutional considera-
tion, surveys during the past decade have demonstrated a
steadily increasing approval by Americans of the use of the
death penalty.
The concept that public attitudes should form a basis for
determining what is cruel and unusual is by now a well-
ingrained principle of constitutional law, having been recog-
nized in Weems, Francis, Robinson, and Trop.1" It appears to
provide a sufficient rejoinder for those who assert, as did Jus-
tice Black in his concurrence to McGuatha v. California, "I that
the infliction of death does not violate the eighth amendment
for the reason that it must be assumed that the framers of the
amendment did not intend to prohibit capital punishment as
"cruel and unusual" since it was in common use at that time
and they did not specifically condemn it. Even so, the determi-
nation of how those attitudes shall be ascertained or measured
has never been definitively made by the Court. Nevertheless,
any concept predicated upon the assumption that ad hoc cali-
brations of public opinion by the Supreme Court are superior
to legislative enactments as a means of monitoring public atti-
tudes ought to be discarded.
The Court's role in the determination of policy, and the
deference it should observe toward its co-equal branch, the
1 408 U.S. at 409 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 See text accompanying notes 136-141 supra.
14 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971).
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legislature, were enunciated in Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Furman.
Our task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-
emphasized, is to pass upon the constitutionality of legisla-
tion that has been enacted and that is challenged. This is the
sole task for judges. We should not allow our personal prefer-
ences as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional action,
or our distaste for such action, to guide our judicial decision
in cases such as these. The temptations to cross that policy
line are very great. In fact, as today's decision reveals, they
are almost irresistible.
48
Thus, the prompt action by legislatures in 28 states to re-enact
the death penalty after Furman should demonstrate that, at
least in those states, public opinion has not evolved to the point
of abhorrence of the death penalty.
2. The Disproportionateness Test
What is meant by the term "disproportionate"? Although
Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil seemed to define dispropor-
tionate as "excessive in length or severity,"'' Justices Brennan
and Marshall in Furman expressed the view that "dispropor-
tionateness" and "excessiveness" are not synonymous terms. 10
They asserted that a punishment, although it is excessive if it
is disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed, may
also be excessive if it serves no purpose more effectively than
would some less severe punishment. 15' For example, a punish-
ment of death for the theft of a chicken would undoubtedly be
considered by reasonable minds to be excessive because it is
disproportionate to the offense. However, a punishment of one
year in prison, even if not disproportionate to the offense of
chicken stealing, nevertheless would be considered excessive in
the view of Justices Brennan and Marshall if it were the case
that a sentence of only six months in jail would serve equally
well the goals of the criminal justice system.
At this point, it might be added that a simple reading of
408 U.S. at 411.
144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).
408 U.S. at 280.
I5 d.
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the eighth amendment itself should allay the notion that "ex-
cessiveness" is the key to a demonstration of the invalidity of
a punishment under the eighth amendment. Indeed, if its fra-
mers had intended that the constitutionality of a punishment
should turn upon whether it could be deemed "excessive," such
a result could have been achieved simply by providing that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor excessive punishments inflicted." '
One is led to inquire: Is a particular punishment cruel and
unusual (even though it cannot be said to be disproportionate
to the offense) simply because it fails to better achieve the
purposes of the criminal justice system than would a lesser
penalty? In other words, must the Court, to find a punishment
constitutional, conclude that it is the least severe punishment
that will achieve a given set of criminal justice system goals?
These questions, although not yet definitively answered by the
Supreme Court, beget yet another inquiry: Even accepting the
commonly asserted goals of our penal system-punishment
through retribution, and the prevention of further criminal
conduct through isolation, rehabilitation, and deterr-
ence153-are our courts equipped to handle the difficulties
which would beset their efforts to draw fine distinctions be-
tween the relative effects-especially the deterrent effect-of
the death penalty and life imprisonment?
In a very real sense, the issue of the comparative deterr-
ence of the death penalty and life imprisonment is the focus of
the capital punishment debate. The question is not whether
the death penalty, in an absolute sense, deters proscribed be-
havior. Rather, the question "is that of marginal deterr-
ence-whether it is a more effective deterrent than the sanction
of long imprisonment.
'154
5I Instead, the eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
,51 Wheeler, supra note 144, at 845 states:
The commonly accepted justifications for the punishment of criminals are
retribution for wrongdoing and prevention of undesired conduct. The latter,
generally referred to as the utilitarian theory of punishment, is often subdi-
vided into the categories deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation.
" F. ZIMRIG AND G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
DETERRENCE].
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On the relation between the severity of a threatened pen-
alty and its deterrent effect, it has been written that:
It seems reasonable to conclude . . that as a general rule,
though not without exceptions, the general preventative ef-
fect of the criminal law increases with the growing severity
of penalties. The theory of increased penalties as a marginal
deterrent is simple and straightforward: all other things being
equal, an increase in the severity of consequences threatened
should reduce the number of people willing to run the risk of
committing a particular criminal act, in much the same way
that increases in the price of a product will decrease the pub-
lic demand for it.' s
However, the price-theory analogy contains a built-in weak-
ness:
An important difference between penalty and price is that a
potential buyer will presumably know the price of a product
before making a purchase decision. No such assumption can
be made about the potential criminal's knowledge of the con-
sequences threatened for a particular behavior. Ignorance
about penalties, which is widespread among potential crimi-
nals, may lead to irrational conduct and negate the possibil-
ity that change in penalties will operate as a marginal deter-
rent for the ignorant."6
The same difficulties which have puzzled and divided cri-
minologists would beset judges attempting to measure the
death penalty's deterrent effect. Almost all commentators have
agreed that no empirical data has yet been assembled to dem-
onstrate that the existence of a law authorizing the death pen-
alty operates to deter the commission of those offenses. It has
been suggested that such a compilation seems impossible for
even the most astute statistician, since it would appear to re-
quire the enumeration of passive events-namely, decisions to
refrain from criminal activity because of the fear of the death
penalty. '57 Some authorities, with a minimum of statistical
support, assert the absence of a death penalty deterrent effect.
For example, Justices Brennan and Marshall intimated their
,s Id. at 194-95.
,58 Id. at 195.
,5 D. LeMaster, Issues Confronting the 1974 Kentucky General Assembly 11 (Ky.
Leg. Research Comm'n Infor. Bull. No. 105, 1973).
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beliefs that capital punishment does not serve as a deterrent.15
Others contend that comparative homicide rates for years
when laws did, and did not, respectively, authorize capital
punishment for murder demonstrate the absence of a deterrent
effect of the death penalty, since some comparisons reveal
lower homicide rates in years after the repeal of the death
penalty than in those years in which the death penalty was in
force. "'9 One enormous gap in these studies, however, is the lack
of any explanation of the effect of the myriad of other factors
which affect, to a greater or lesser extent, changes in the homi-
cide rate.
Some commentators view the ascertainment of the deter-
rent effect of the death penalty as a necessary step in the deter-
mination by the courts of its "excessiveness," on the ground
that plausible reasons may exist to gauge severity in terms of
deterrence as well as retribution."' 0 "Since the needless inflic-
tion of pain is more cruel than the necessary infliction of pain,
the efficacy of a particular punishment is an issue the court
cannot avoid."1 1 In any event, it seems clear that a totally
satisfactory calculation of the death penalty's deterrent effect
is presently unavailable. Furthermore, even if the penological
effect of a given punishment, like the precise nature of the
public's opinion on a given subject, were susceptible of precise
measurement, such determinations are among those which
courts are not as well suited as legislatures to make.
While it is doubtless true, as Chief Justice Burger wrote in
his Furman dissent, that a "sober analysis" of current sentenc-
ing and correctional procedures in our criminal justice system
is long overdue,1 2 he is equally correct in his assertion that the
eighth amendment "is not addressed to social utility and does
not command that enlightened principles of penology always
be followed."'6 3 The eighth amendment prescribes a minimum
standard for punishments; they must not be "cruel and unu-
sual." It does not place upon the legislature the affirmative
J 408 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 349 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
" Dm anmNcE, supra note 154, at 189.
" The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 23, at 81.
"' Id. at 82.
408 U.S. at 402.
i Id. at 394.
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duty to provide only those penalties which, in penological
theory, are currently deemed the most effective.
It is submitted that, because the relative deterrent effects
of capital punishment and protracted imprisonment appar-
ently cannot be ascertained by reference to judicially managa-
ble standards, and because judges cannot be presumed to be,
ipso facto, criminologists, the Supreme Court should reject the
view espoused by Justices Brennan and Marshall in Furman
that the punishment for a given offense may be excessive and
unconstitutional simply because some penalty of lesser magni-
tude than the prescribed punishment would serve equally well
both the aim of deterrence and the other commonly accepted
goals of the criminal justice system. If "excessiveness" is to be
employed at all as a test of the constitutionality of punish-
ments under the eighth amendment, then the Court should
retain, as a point of departure in the development of any new
rules, Justice Field's classic concept that views a punishment
as excessive, and thus cruel and unusual, only if it can be said
to be disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing constitutes an attempt to measure the im-
pact of Furman v. Georgia upon the previously existing capital
punishment laws of Kentucky and other states; to catalogue
the subsequent enactment by the legislatures of 28 states of
laws designed to restore the death penalty, ostensibly within
the guidelines established by the Furman decision; and to eval-
uate Furman, prior eighth amendment decisions by the Su-
preme Court and the background of the eighth amendment
itself. This has been done with a view toward determining
whether the nine separate opinions by the Justices in the
Furman case represent only the first step toward an absolute
judicial abolition of the death penalty. While it may be true,
as predicted '64 by former Justice Tom Clark, that the Supreme
Court will delay action for as long as it conveniently can in the
hope that either the Congress or the state legislatures will satis-
"I Interview with former Associate Justice Tom Clark, Oct. 24, 1974.
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factorily resolve the eighth amendment questions surrounding
the retention of the death penalty, it is clear that if "the other
shoe falls" and the Court eventually holds that the death pen-
alty is, in itself, unconstitutional, then the Court will have
turned its back on history, and mankind will have moved into
a new era. It remains to be seen, however, whether (to adopt
Mr. Jefferson's analogy), 65 in changing from "the jacket which
fitted him as a boy," mankind will have changed to a garment
which is, perhaps, too large.
David LeMaster
U See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kevcheval, July 12, 1816 in 15
THE WnrrnNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40-42 (Memorial ed. 1904) (quoted by Blackmun,
J.), 408 U.S. at 409 n.7.
